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We consider the possibilities offered by Gaussian states and operations for two honest parties,
Alice and Bob, to obtain privacy against a third eavesdropping party, Eve. We first extend the
security analysis of the protocol proposed in M. Navascue´s et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 010502
(2005). Then, we prove that a generalized version of this protocol does not allow to distill a secret
key out of bound entangled Gaussian states.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The study of those tasks that can be achieved by pro-
cessing information encoded on quantum states is the
main scope of Quantum Information Theory (QIT). The
basic unit for quantum information is the so-called quan-
tum bit, or qubit, namely a two-dimensional quantum
system. Moreover, quantum correlations, or entangle-
ment, constitute a key resource in QIT, their unit be-
ing the entangled bit or ebit. In general, any (quantum)
information task can be seen as an inter-conversion of
resources. For instance, quantum teleportation [1] can
be summarized as the process transforming 1 ebit + 2
bits → 1 qubit, while dense coding [2] corresponds to
the transformation 1 ebit + 1 qubit → 2 bits. Moving
to cryptography, secret bits are a fundamental resource.
These are perfectly correlated and random bits shared by
two honest parties, Alice and Bob, about which a third
dishonest party, Eve, has no information. Any quantum
key distribution protocol can be seen as the process of
distributing secret bits through an insecure channel by
means of quantum states. Therefore, relevant questions
in this context are to identify those quantum states con-
taining secret correlations and show how to distill these
correlations into a perfect secret key. Indeed, it has re-
cently been shown that a quantum state contains secret
correlations if and only if it is entangled [3].
In these last years, Quantum Information Theory for
Continuous Variables systems has proved to be a very
fruitful area, as it allows theory to connect easily with ex-
periments (for a review, see [4]). In this case, the informa-
tion encoding is done on continuous quantum variables,
such as the quadratures of the electromagnetic field. Re-
cent works have been developed in the aim of reproduc-
ing well-knownQuantum Information protocols for finite-
dimensional systems in this new setup. Examples of these
are quantum cryptography [5] or quantum teleportation
[6]. Interestingly, most of these protocols work using
only Gaussian operations, i.e., operations that transform
Gaussian states into Gaussian states. This is important
because Gaussian operations are easy to implement ex-
perimentally with high accuracy level. A beam splitter
or a squeezer are examples of Gaussian operations, while
photon counting constitutes a non-Gaussian operation.
Up to now, non-Gaussian operations are challenging from
an experimental point of view (see however [7]).
A significant effort has been devoted to study the pos-
sibilities and limitations Gaussian Operations provide to
Quantum Information protocols. We know, for example,
that entanglement distillation of Gaussian states with
Gaussian operations is impossible [8, 9, 10]. More pre-
cisely: although there exist entangled Gaussian states
that are distillable to singlets, the distillation process re-
quires a non-Gaussian operation. Or, in other words,
the process of converting Gaussian quantum states into
perfect ebits by means of Gaussian local operations and
classical communication (GLOCC) is impossible. How-
ever, ebits is not the only information resource two col-
laborating parties may want to establish through quan-
tum states. Actually, distillation of perfect secret bits
by GLOCC is known to be possible from some Gaussian
states [5]. Thus, the set of Gaussian states and opera-
tions can sometimes be sufficient for cryptographic ap-
plications. At first sight, this result may seem surprising
taking into account that Gaussian states have a positive
Wigner function, i.e., there is a local variable model that
reproduces the correlations given by Gaussian measure-
ments.
In this article, we analyze the process of extracting se-
cret bits from several copies of a given Gaussian state
when the honest parties are allowed to perform local
Gaussian operations and communicate classically. In the
derivation of all the results, it is assumed that Alice and
Bob share N independent copies of a known Gaussian
state. That is, we do not consider the important prob-
lem of the distribution and estimation of these states.
They simply constitute an initially given resource that
the honest parties will to convert into secret bits. We
start reviewing the results of [11], where it was shown
that, provided Eve is restricted to individual attacks, a
secret key can be extracted from any entanglement dis-
tillable state. We extend the security analysis of this
protocol for the case of collective attacks, giving a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for secret key distillation.
We also show that there is no way in which the honest
parties can attain privacy with our protocol if the ini-
tial state is bound entangled. This is true even if Eve is
assumed to measure her state before any reconciliation
process has taken place. This suggests that Gaussian op-
2erations may be useless to extract a secret key out of
bound entangled Gaussian states, in opposition to the
astounding results in [12] for finite-dimensional systems.
The article is organized as follows: Section II is a brief
introduction to the Gaussian states and Gaussian oper-
ations formalism. The reader familiar with both topics
can skip this part. In Section III, we analyze the limits
of the protocol introduced in [11]. In particular, we show
that it allows to prove the security of sufficiently entan-
gled states, while it fails for any bound entangled state.
Section IV is devoted to our conclusions.
II. GAUSSIAN STATES AND OPERATIONS
In this article we consider quantum systems of n
canonical degrees of freedom, called modes, belonging
to B(H(Rn)). These are characterized by operators
(X1, P1, ..., Xn, Pn) = (R1, ..., R2n) satisfying the com-
mutation relations [Rj , Rj ] = i(σn)jk, where
σn = ⊕ni=1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
, (1)
is called the symplectic matrix. In this context, it can be
proved that any operator A transforming n-mode states
to n-mode states can be expressed as
A = (2π)−n
∫
χA(ξ)W−ξd
2nξ, (2)
where χA(ξ) is the so called characteristic function and
Wξ are the Weyl operators, defined as
Wξ = e
iξTσR, (3)
and R = (R1...R2n). Weyl operators satisfy the well-
known Weyl relations
WξWη = e
−iξTσηWξ+η. (4)
When A corresponds to the density operator associated
to a certain state, χA(ξ) is called the characteristic func-
tion of the state A. One can also define the Wigner func-
tion WA(ξ) of A as
WA(ξ) = (2π)−2n
∫
eiξσηχA(η)d
2nη. (5)
The Wigner function behaves as a quasi probability dis-
tribution in phase space. It is normalized, and integrat-
ing over Xi or Pi for each mode gives the corresponding
probability distribution of the remaining canonical vari-
ables.
For every state ρ, one can define its displacement vec-
tor d as dk = tr{ρRk} and its covariance matrix γ as
γkl = tr{ρ{Rk − dk, Rl − dl}+}, where {}+ denotes the
anti-commutator. Because of the Heisenberg uncertainty
relations, any state has to satisfy
γ ≥ iσ. (6)
Gaussian states are those n-mode quantum states
whose characteristic function is of the form:
χ(ξ) = eiξσd−ξσ
T γσξ/4. (7)
Thus, any Gaussian state is completely described by its
displacement vector d and covariance matrix γ.
Gaussian operations are completely positive maps
transforming Gaussian states into Gaussian states.
Gaussian operations were fully characterized in [8, 10].
There, the authors show that a Gaussian state G with
covariance matrix Γ and displacement ∆ can be associ-
ated to each Gaussian operation G. In particular, if Γ
and ∆ are given by
Γ =
(
Γ1 Γ12
ΓT12 Γ2
)
∆ =
(
∆1
∆2
)
, (8)
then the application of G on a Gaussian state (γ, d) pro-
duces a Gaussian state (γ′, d′) such that
γ′ = Γ˜1 − Γ˜12 1
Γ˜2 + γ
Γ˜T12
d′ = ∆1 + Γ˜12
1
Γ˜2 + γ
(∆2 + d), (9)
where Γ˜ = (1 ⊕ θ)Γ(1 ⊕ θ) and θ = D(1,−1, 1,−1...)
is the transformation that changes the sign of the mo-
menta. Throughout this article, D(a, b, . . .) will denote a
diagonal matrix with non-zero entries a, b and so on.
A fundamental Gaussian operation is homodyne de-
tection, that is, the physical measurement of one of the
canonical coordinates. Let γ define a Gaussian state with
zero displacement vector. Suppose γ can be divided into
modes as
γ =
(
A C
CT B
)
. (10)
If we measure the X component of each of the modes cor-
responding to A, obtaining the result (X1, X2, ...), system
B will turn into a Gaussian state with covariance matrix
[9]
B′ = B − CT (XAX)MPC, (11)
and displacement vector
dB = C
T (XAX)MPdA, (12)
where dA = (X1, 0, X2, 0...), MP denotes the pseudo-
inverse (inverse on the range) and X is the projector
X = D(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0...).
Another important subset of Gaussian operations is
constituted by the so-called symplectic transformations.
It can be proved that unitary Gaussian operations are
the ones that transform the canonical coordinates in the
following way:
R′ = SR+ T, (13)
3where T is a vector and S is a matrix belonging to the
symplectic group Sp (2n,R). The symplectic group is
given by those matrices leaving invariant the symplectic
matrix, i.e. satisfying SσST = σ. When T = 0, the
transformation is called symplectic. Under symplectic
transformations, the displacement vector and the covari-
ance matrix change into d′ = Sd and γ′ = SγST . Sym-
plectic transformations are very relevant because of the
following
Theorem (Williamson) [13]: For any real and posi-
tive definite 2n×2nmatrix, C, one can find a symplectic
matrix S such that
SCST = ⊕ni=1λi1 2, (14)
where λi > 0 are called the symplectic eigenvalues of C.
Because of (6), if we apply this theorem to the co-
variance matrix of a certain state, we will get that all
its symplectic eigenvalues λi have to be greater or equal
than one. Moreover, for a Gaussian state with covariance
matrix γ, the identity tr(ρ2) = det(γ)−1/2 holds (recall
that tr(ρ2) gives a measure of the purity of ρ). So, a
Gaussian state is pure if and only if all its symplectic
eigenvalues are equal to one.
Finally, let us give some known results about entangle-
ment and Gaussian states that will next be used. In this
case, one considers Gaussian states in bipartite systems
of n+m modes, where Alice and Bob’s systems are of n
and m modes, respectively.
Theorem [14]: Let γAB be the covariance matrix of
a Gaussian state in a bipartite system. This state is
separable if and only if
γAB ≥ γa ⊕ γb, (15)
for certain physical covariance matrices γa and γb in sys-
tems A and B, respectively.
Partial transposition is a positive, but not completely
positive, map that plays a key role in entanglement the-
ory. In the case of continuous variable systems, after
partial transposition on, say, system B, the sign of Bob’s
momenta is changed while the rest of canonical coordi-
nates is kept unchanged. At the level of covariance matri-
ces, this means that γAB → γ′AB = θBγABθB. Therefore,
a state ρ has non-positive partial transposition (NPPT)
when γ′AB does not define a positive operator, that is
γAB 6≥ iσ˜, (16)
where σ˜ = (1A ⊕ θB)σ(1 A ⊕ θB). It can be shown that
this condition is equivalent to
γAB 6≥ σ˜γ−1ABσ˜T . (17)
The positivity of partial transposition, also known as
PPT criterion, represents a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for separability for 1× 1 [15] and 1×N Gaussian
states [14], while it is only a necessary condition for the
rest of systems [14]. It also gives a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for entanglement distillability: a Gaus-
sian state is distillable if and only if it is NPPT [16].
III. SECRET BITS FROM GAUSSIAN STATES
In our quantum cryptographic scenario, there are two
parties, Alice and Bob, who share several copies of a cer-
tain Gaussian state, ρAB. As said, it is assumed that
the honest parties know to have N independent copies
of ρAB. There is also an eavesdropper, Eve, that keeps
the purification of that state. In a prepare and measure
scheme, the assumption in the state preparation means
that Eve interacts identically, individually and in a Gaus-
sian way with the states sent to Bob by Alice. Alice and
Bob perform some individual measurements over their
copies and afterwards apply Advantage Distillation, Er-
ror Correction and Privacy Amplification techniques to
extract a perfect secret key. These three processes con-
stitute the reconciliation part of the protocol. We con-
sider two type of attacks: (i) individual, where Eve per-
forms individual measurements, possibly non-Gaussian,
over her set of states before Alice and Bob’s public rec-
onciliation, or (ii) collective, where Eve waits until the
reconciliation is finished and then decides what (possibly
collective) measurement gives her more information on
the final key. Note that this second type of attacks is
the most general under the mentioned assumption in the
state preparation. On the other hand, to assume that
Eve measures her state before the reconciliation process,
as for individual attacks, appears quite reasonable from
an experimental point of view.
In this section, we first review the protocol described in
[11]. There, it was proved that (i) a secret key can be dis-
tilled from any NPPT Gaussian state, provided that Eve
is restricted to individual attacks, (ii) there exist slightly
entangled states that become insecure, with our protocol,
when Eve’s attack is collective and (iii) key distillation
secure against collective attacks is still possible for suffi-
ciently entangled states. Here, we will first improve the
security analysis against collective attacks, giving a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for secret key distillation
from Gaussian states with our protocol. Later, we will
show that our scheme does not allow to extract a secret
key out of bound entangled Gaussian states.
A. Key distillation protocol
The key distillation protocol presented in [11] consists
of the following steps:
1. Starting from ρAB, Alice and Bob apply the
GLOCC protocol of [16] mapping any NPPT Gaus-
sian state of n+mmodes into an NPPT 1×1 Gaus-
sian and symmetric state, whose CM, see Eq. (10),
is
A = B =
(
λ 0
0 λ
)
C =
(
cx 0
0 −cp
)
, (18)
where λ ≥ 0 and cx ≥ cp ≥ 0. The positivity
condition reads λ2−cxcp−1 ≥ λ(cx−cp) while the
4entanglement (NPPT) condition gives
λ2 + cxcp − 1 < λ(cx + cp). (19)
2. Each of them measure the X quadratures of their
modes, XA, XB. As soon as all measurements are
done, Alice randomly chooses a real numberX0 > 0
and sends it to Bob via a classical channel. If their
measured quadratures satisfy |XA| = |XB| = X0,
they accept the results. Otherwise, they discard
them. They then make binary these results accord-
ing to the prescription Xi = X0 → 0, Xi = −X0 →
1, i = A,B, thus obtaining a list of correlated bits.
3. Alice and Bob apply Classical Advantage Distil-
lation [17] over their lists of symbols: they ran-
domly choose a set of N indices, and build bi-
naryN -vectors with the corresponding symbols ap-
pearing in their lists: (A1, A2, ..., AN ) for Alice
and (B1, ..., BN) for Bob. Then, Alice generates
a random bit, c ∈ {0, 1}, and sends Bob a vec-
tor (c1, ..., cN ) such that A1 ⊕ c1 = A2 ⊕ c2 =
... = AN ⊕ cN = c. Next, Bob computes the
quantities c′i = Bi ⊕ ci, i = 1, . . . , N . In case
c′1 = c
′
2 = ... = c
′
N = c
′, Bob accepts the sym-
bol c′. Otherwise, he discards it. Anyhow, after
this step Alice and Bob will have to throw away all
the symbols used and repeat the process with the
remaining symbols. At the end, they will have a
reduced list of more correlated symbols.
4. Alice and Bob apply Error Correction and Privacy
Amplification protocols to the new list in order to
obtain a secret key.
Let us denote by ωAB Alice and Bob’s 1×1 state after
step 1 and by ǫB the probability that Alice and Bob ob-
tain different results (namely, (X0,−X0) or (−X0, X0))
after the homodyne measurements and post-selection.
Let us also denote by |e±±〉 Eve’s resulting states when
Alice and Bob measure (±X0,±X0). If Eve is restricted
to individual attacks, i.e. she measures before step 3, the
honest parties can distill a key when [18]
ǫB
1− ǫB < |〈e++|e−−〉|. (20)
Actually, this security condition also holds for the case
in which Eve applies a measurement on a finite number
of copies of her states before the reconciliation process
has started. As shown in [11], Eq. (20) is equivalent to
demand that the initial state ρAB was NPPT.
Now, one would naturally wonder how this security
condition has to be modified when Eve is allowed to
perform a collective attack, i.e. she can measure after
the public reconciliation. In this case, Eve’s informa-
tion during the whole protocol is quantum. Note that,
once the honest parties accept a symbol after Advan-
tage Distillation, they can agree to both change its sign
or not. This is so because the symplectic transformation
(XA, PA, XB, PB)→ (−XA,−PA,−XB,−PB) leaves the
Gaussian state ωAB invariant. Therefore, we can consider
that Alice’s N symbols employed in a successful perfor-
mance of step 3 are equal, and so Bob’s. That is, the
global state resulting from step 3 is (see also [19])
ρABE =
1− ǫBN
2
(
[00]⊗ [e++]⊗N + [11]⊗ [e−−]⊗N
)
+
ǫBN
2
(
[01]⊗ [e+−]⊗N + [10]⊗ [e−+]⊗N
)
(21)
where [ψ] denotes the projector onto |ψ〉 and ǫBN is Bob’s
error probability after Advantage Distillation. For large
N , this error has the form [18]
ǫBN ∝
(
ǫB
1− ǫB
)N
. (22)
In step 4, Alice and Bob apply the one-way key dis-
tillation protocol given in [20]. This protocol deals with
the case where Alice has a classical random variable, A,
correlated to a quantum state on Bob and Eve’s hands,
ρB|A and ρE|A. The achievable key rate satisfies [20]
K→ ≥ χ(A : B)− χ(A : E) (23)
where χ(X : Y ) denotes the Holevo bound [21], i.e.,
χ(X : Y ) = S(ρY ) −
∑
X p (X)S (ρY |X) and ρY =∑
X p (X)ρY |X . In our case, Alice and Bob have classi-
cal variables, so χ(A : B) is actually equal to the mutual
information I(A : B), which is a function of ǫBN . Let us
compute in what follows χ(A : E).
Notice that in the limit of large N , the error terms in
(21) can be neglected, since ǫBN → 0. This means that
the states ρE|A are actually pure, so χ(A : E) ≈ S(ρE)
for large N . If the covariance matrix associated to the
state ωAB is given by
γAB =
(
γx R
RT S
)
, (24)
where γx, R, T and S are 2×2 matrices, one can see that
for large N , S(ρE) ∝ kNE , where
log kE = −(X0, X0)(S −RTγ−1x R− γ−1x )
(
X0
X0
)
. (25)
Actually, one has that S − RTγ−1x R − γ−1x =
{(σγ−1ABσT )x}−1 − γ−1x . Throughout this article, (M)x
denotes the projection of a generic operator M onto
the x space. It follows from this expression that kE =
|〈e++|e−−〉|2. Comparing now the two quantities, it is
clear that a positive key rate is possible when
ǫB
1− ǫB < |〈e++|e−−〉|
2 (26)
This gives a sufficient condition for distilling a secret key.
On the other hand, if Eve applies the particular attack
proposed in [22], our protocol turns out to be insecure
if Eq. (26) does not hold [11]. That is, Eq. (26) is
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FIG. 1: Security analysis of isometric 1 × 1 Gaussian states,
with covariance matrix satisfying, see Eq. (18), cx = cp = c.
All physical states are above the solid line. The dashed line
defines the entanglement limit, that coincides with the se-
curity bound against incoherent attacks. States below the
dashed-dotted line are secure against any attack. It is implic-
itly assumed that Alice and Bob measure the X quadratures.
indeed the necessary and sufficient condition for positive
key extraction using our GLOCC protocol from Gaussian
states. Therefore, this closes the security gap left open
in the analysis of [11] (see also Fig. 1).
This result could somehow be expected: the applica-
tion of the projectors [±X0] transforms the original Gaus-
sian state into an effective 2-qubit state that tends to a
Bell diagonal state in the limit N going to infinite. The
necessary and sufficient for positive key extraction from
a two-qubit state has recently been derived in [19]. The
bound given there looks identical to (26).
B. Bound entangled states
Our next result concerns the distillation of secret bits
from PPT Gaussian states using the previous GLOCC
protocol. Recall that in the Gaussian scenario, a state is
entanglement distillable if and only if it is NPPT. This
means that there do not exist NPPT bound entangled
states. It is quite clear that the considered protocol, in
the form previously presented, does not allow to extract
a secret key from any PPT state. Indeed, in step 1 any
PPT state is mapped into a 1×1 PPT state, which is sep-
arable [15], and no secret key can be extracted from sep-
arable states [23]. This is why we consider a generalized
version of the protocol above, where step 1 is replaced by:
1.’ Alice and Bob perform any GLOCC pre-processing,
possibly non-deterministic, over their states. Then, they
measure the X quadrature of one of their modes as in
step 2 and the protocol proceeds as explained above. It
is next shown that even in this more general scenario
and restricting Eve to an individual attack, no secret key
distillation is possible from PPT states.
As above, ǫB defines Bob’s error probability after ho-
modyne measurement and postselection. Let ρ+ and ρ−
be Eve’s resulting states when Alice and Bob measure
(X0, X0) or (−X0,−X0), respectively. Contrary to the
previous situation, these states can now be mixed. Then,
if Eve is restricted to individual attacks, a secret key can
be distilled using our scheme if and only if
ǫB
1− ǫB < tr
(√√
ρ−ρ+
√
ρ−
)
. (27)
It is possible to derive this formula from [18]. There, it
is shown that Eve’s error probability behaves as ǫEN ∝
(
∑M
i=1
√
tr(ρ+Mi)tr(ρ−Mi))
N , where Mi is the i
th oper-
ator corresponding to the ith outcome of Eve’s measure-
ment,
∑
iMi = 1 . Now, one has to take into account
that the minimum of
∑
i
√
tr(ρ+Mi)tr(ρ−Mi)) over all
possible measurements is equal to the Uhlmann’s fidelity
[24] of ρ+ and ρ−, namely tr(
√√
ρ−ρ+
√
ρ−). A deriva-
tion of this result can be found in [25]. Recall that Bob’s
error probability after step 3 goes as (22). Thus, for Alice
and Bob to extract a secret key it is enough that ǫBN de-
creases exponentially faster than ǫEN . Then, condition
(27) immediately applies.
Our goal is now to express (27) in terms of γAB. In
fact, it will be seen that (27) is equivalent to the NPPT
condition for Gaussian states.
As usual, it is supposed that Eve’s state is entangled
with Alice and Bob’s one, so that the whole state is pure.
Let’s assume that Alice and Bob have just finished the
GLOCC pre-processing of step 1’, and let’s call γ
(r)
AB the
resulting reduced covariance matrix that contains only
their first modes. We introduce the following notation:
γABE =

γ
(r)
AB L E
LT γ
(m)
AB G
ET GT γE

 F =
(
E
G
)
γ
(r)
AB =
(
γx R
RT S
)
(γ
(r)
AB)
−1 =
(
X Y
Y T Z
)
, (28)
where γx and X correspond to the XA, XB space. The
following formula will next be useful [26]:
(
A C
CT B
)−1
=
(
(A− C 1BCT )−1 A−1C(CT 1AC −B)−1)
(CT 1AC −B)−1)CTA−1 (B − CT 1AC)−1
)
.
(29)
Using equations (11) and (12), it is straightforward to
check that ρ+ is described by:
γ′E = γE − ETβE
d′E = E
Tβ


X0
X0
0
0

 , (30)
6where
β =
(
γ−1x 0
0 0
)
. (31)
Similarly, if Alice and Bob measure −X0, Eve’s corre-
sponding state ρ− will have the same covariance matrix
and opposite displacement vector.
Let us first calculate the right hand side of (27). It can
be shown (see Appendix A) that
tr(
√√
ρ−ρ+
√
ρ−) = e
−d
′
T
E
γ
′
−1
E
d′
E . (32)
Now we want to write this in terms of γAB. If we define
E =
(
Ex
Ep
)
, (33)
where Ex is the part of E corresponding to the X quadra-
tures, we only have to substitute to get that d
′T
E γ
′−1
E d
′
E
can be written as
(
X0 X0
)
γ−1x Ex(γE − ETx γ−1x Ex)−1ETx γ−1x
(
X0
X0
)
.
(34)
Using formula (29) applied to the matrix
K =
(
γx Ex
ETx γE
)−1
, (35)
and the condition KK−1 = 1 , we have that Ex(γE −
Exγ
−1
x Ex)
−1ETx γ
−1
x = γx(γx − Exγ−1E ETx )−1 − 1 . Sub-
stituting, we arrive at
d
′T
E γ
′−1
E d
′
E =(
X0 X0
)
((γx − Exγ−1E ETx )−1 − γ−1x )
(
X0
X0
)
.(36)
Note that (γx−Exγ−1E ETx ) is just the projection of (γAB−
Fγ−1E F
T ) onto the x space. Therefore, one can replace
in the previous expression (γx − Exγ−1E ETx ) and γ−1x by
(γAB − Fγ−1E FT )x and (γ−1AB)x.
On the other hand, we have assumed that Eve purifies
the state shared by Alice and Bob. Since all purifications
are equivalent up to a unitary transformation on Eve’s
space, one can consider a particular purification without
loosing generality. One possible purification, see (28), is
given by [27]
F = σAB [−(σABγAB)2 − 1 ]1/2θ γE = θγABθ. (37)
If S is the symplectic matrix such that STγABS is diag-
onal, one can verify that
Fγ−1E F
T = −σABS(⊕k
√
λ2k − 11 2)S−1S(⊕k
1
λk
1 2)
ST (S−1)T (⊕k
√
λ2k − 11 2)STσAB
= −σABS(⊕k λ
2
k − 1
λk
1 2)S
TσAB
= γAB − σABγ−1ABσTAB . (38)
So γAB − FγEFT = σγ−1ABσT and tr(
√√
ρ−ρ+
√
ρ−) is
equal to
exp
[
−X20
(
1 1
) (
(σABγ
−1
ABσ
T
AB)
−1
x − (γAB)−1x
)( 1
1
)]
.
(39)
The next step is to calculate the left hand side of (27).
Let ρ(XA, XB) be the probability density of (XA, XB),
the X quadratures of the reduced state γ(r). The corre-
sponding Wigner function satisfies:
w(ξ) ∝ e−ξT (γ(r)AB)−1ξ. (40)
If ξ = (xA1 , x
B
1 , ~p), then, according to (28),
ρ(xA1 , x
B
1 ) ∝
∫
e−(ξ
T (γ
(r)
AB
)−1ξ)d~p
=
∫
e−(~x
TX~x+2~xTY ~p+~pTZ~p)d~p. (41)
Finally, we get
ρ(xA1 , x
B
1 ) ∝ e−~x
T (X−Y Z−1Y T )~x. (42)
But, looking at (29), we see that this is just
exp(−~xTγ−1x ~x). Writing
γx =
(
a b
b c
)
, (43)
it is easy to see that, in our protocol,
ǫB
1− ǫB = exp
(
− 4bX
2
0
ac− b2
)
. (44)
In a similar way, one can define
(σγ−1ABσ
T )x =
(
d e
e f
)
, (45)
and then, the term in the exponent of Eq. (39) can be
expressed as
−X20 (
d− 2e+ f
de − f2 −
a− 2b+ c
ac− b2 ). (46)
Collecting all these results, the condition (27) for dis-
tilling a key with this protocol is equivalent to
d+ f − 2e
df − e2 −
a+ c+ 2b
ac− b2 < 0. (47)
We are now in a position to prove the next
Theorem: A secret key secure against individual at-
tacks can be distilled with our GLOCC protocol from a
Gaussian state if and only if the state is NPPT.
Proof: The idea of the proof is to show that condition
(27) is equivalent to the PPT criterion. First, note that
Eq. (47) can be rewritten as
(
1 −1 ) ((σ˜γ−1ABσ˜T )−1x − γ−1x )
(
1
−1
)
< 0 (48)
7Since (σ˜γ−1ABσ˜
T )x and γx are positive operators, the pre-
vious equation implies that γAB − σ˜γ−1ABσ˜T 6≥ 0. But
this is the condition for a Gaussian state to be NPPT,
as stated in (17). Therefore, if a key can be distilled out
of a Gaussian state with the previous protocol, this state
has to be NPPT. For the opposite implication one sim-
ply has to apply the protocol of [11], that has previously
been described.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have analyzed the extraction of secret
bits from quantum states in the every-day-growing field
of Quantum Information Theory with Continuous Vari-
ables. We have first reviewed the protocol and results of
[11]: a secret key can be distilled from any NPPT state
when Eve is restricted to individual attacks. In the more
general scenario of collective attacks, we extend the anal-
ysis of [11], providing a necessary and sufficient condition
for key distillability, with the considered protocol. This
protocol turns out to be completely useless for bound
entangled states, even in the case of individual attacks.
Before concluding, we would like to discuss several open
questions and implications that follow from our results.
First, note that all the presented results aim at answer-
ing whether secret bits can be extracted from Gaussian
states by GLOCC. In terms of resources, we study the
conversion of Gaussian states into secret bits. However,
very little is said about the rate governing this conver-
sion. This problem appears as a natural follow-up of the
present work. Notice that, strictly speaking, the consid-
ered key-distillation protocol has zero rate. Indeed, the
probability that Alice and Bob obtain the outcomes ±X0
is zero. Of course, the analysis can easily be adapted to
a protocol with finite rate: Alice and Bob only have to
accept outcomes in the range |X0 ± δ|, where δ > 0.
By choosing a properly small δ, the security conditions
still hold because of continuity, while the protocol auto-
matically acquires a finite rate. It is intriguing the fact
that both security conditions, Eqs. (20) and (26), are
independent of X0. This suggests that key distillation
should still be possible when Alice and Bob directly as-
sign a bit to the sign of their measurements, without
discarding any value. This would represent a significant
improvement of the final key-rate. Unfortunately, this
result remains unproven. It would also be desirable to
adapt the reconciliation process to the continuous char-
acter of the measured quantity, in a similar way as the
sliced-reconciliation protocols for error correction intro-
duced in [28].
Another related question is the distribution of quan-
tum states. All our results were based on the hypothesis
that Alice and Bob share N independent realization of
the same known Gaussian state. However, in any practi-
cal cryptographic protocol, Alice and Bob will send and
measure quantum states through an insecure channel.
From the observed probabilities, they have to infer what
their correlations with the environment are. This is in-
deed a very delicate process that has not been considered
here. For instance, the honest parties cannot in principle
exclude the existence of correlations between the differ-
ent quantum systems they measure. While in our case,
we simply assume that N copies of the same Gaussian
state were given as an initial resource.
At a more fundamental level, our analysis represents
one of the first steps in the identification of the set of
Gaussian states that can be converted into secret bits
by GLOCC. As discussed in [11], for any Gaussian state
one can define GKD and GED, quantities that specify
the amount of secret and entangled bits extractable from
it by GLOCC protocols. The results of Refs. [8, 9, 10]
imply that GED = 0. On the other hand, it follows
from [11] and this work that GKD is non-zero for suf-
ficiently entangled NPPT states. It would be relevant
to extend the present results, proving that GKD > 0
for some states violating our security conditions. An al-
most unexplored possibility in this direction is the use of
global, but still Gaussian, operations by Alice and Bob.
In particular, note that in the analyzed protocol, all the
quantum operations were at the single-copy level. There-
fore, it is unknown whether the use of coherent quantum
operations gives any improvement for key extraction. A
related open question is the existence of the so-called “en-
tanglement purification” protocols [8], where Alice and
Bob map many copies of a noisy entangled state into
a pure entangled state (not necessarily maximally en-
tangled). The goal would then be to decouple the hon-
est parties’ correlation from the eavesdropper, something
that it is sufficient in a cryptographic scenario.
The case of bound entangled states is also of particu-
lar interest. Indeed, our result suggest that GKD = 0 for
all these states (c.f. [12]). In the same spirit as in Ref.
[12], one could look for Gaussian secret states. These
would be states for which there exist Gaussian measure-
ments by Alice and Bob almost perfectly correlated about
which Eve has arbitrarily small information. The results
of section III B rule out this possibility for PPT states.
Indeed, if this were the case, there would be PPT secret
states. This would imply that our protocol would work
for a PPT state, which has been shown here to be im-
possible. Unfortunately, this does not allow to conclude
that GKD = 0 for PPT states. More in general, it would
also be interesting to prove that KD > 0 for a Gaussian
PPT state, i.e., that key extraction is possible, even if the
distillation protocol employs a non-Gaussian operation.
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8APPENDIX: PROOF OF RELATION (32)
From the definition of the characteristic function and
relation (3) it can be derived that
ρ21 → χ(2)1 (ξ) = e−iξ
Tσd′
E
−ξTσD(γ′
E
)σT ξ/4S(γ′E). (49)
Therefore,
√
ρ1 → χ(1/2)1 (ξ) = e−iξ
Tσd′
E
−ξTσV (γ′
E
)σT ξ/4H(γ′E),
(50)
and then
√
ρ1ρ0
√
ρ1 → A(γ′E , d′E)e−ξ
TB(γ′
E
)ξ+iξTσr(γ′
E
,d). (51)
Using the cyclic property of the trace, we get
tr(
√
ρ1ρ0
√
ρ1) = tr(ρ1ρ0) = e
−2d
′
T
E
γ
′
−1
E
d′
E |γ′E |−1/2 =
A(γ′E , d
′
E). One then has
√√
ρ1ρ0
√
ρ1 →
C(γ′E)
√
A(γ′E , d
′
E)e
−ξTU(γ′
E
)ξ+iξT σs(γ′
E
,d′
E
), (52)
which, after substitution, gives
tr(
√√
ρ1ρ0
√
ρ1) = e
−d′
′
T
E
γ
′
−1
E
d′
EM(γ′E) (53)
However, note that if d′E = 0, ρ0 = ρ1, and
tr(
√√
ρ0ρ0
√
ρ0) = 1. This implies that M(γ
′
E) = 1,
and so:
tr(
√√
ρ1ρ0
√
ρ1) = e
−d
′
T
E
γ
′
−1
E
d′
E (54)
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